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THESIS SUMMARY 
My interest in studying income inequality in Brazil started during my study abroad in 
Salvador, Brazil in the Northeast of the country in Spring 2016.  Before arriving, I was aware 
that Brazil’s economy had seen a major boom prior the recession that began in 2015. From my 
short time in the city, it was apparent that Salvador was rapidly changing, but I became doubtful 
of how this development was impacting all citizens. Extravagant shopping malls and luxurious 
amenities seemed to arise everyday; however these spaces were primarily accessible to white, 
upper class citizens, which account for less than 10% of the city’s population. Moreover, I had 
the unique opportunity to study abroad in Brazil during a major shift in the nation’s political 
structure, the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. Rousseff’s impeachment coincided 
with corruption charges against her predecessor, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula). As Rousseff 
was considered Lula’s handpicked successor to the presidency, these charges of corruption 
destroyed the credibility of the Workers’ Party, a leftist political party founded by Lula. 
Corruption allegations also led to increased critical reflection of both Lula and Rousseff’s 
accomplishments, because it seemed impossible that a person bribed by a large company could 
also fight for the citizens of the nation. 
. During this Workers’ Party’s time in power, issues surrounding race and gender were 
brought to light, new social programs were introduced meant to benefit the poorest citizens in the 
country, and national income inequality greatly decreased. I came across a government report 
with GINI scores, a measure of income inequality, for Brazilian municipalities from 2000 to 
2010, a time frame that includes the full duration of Lula’s presidency. With this information, I 
would be able to conduct an economic analysis showing how Brazil changed under Lula’s 
administration, and how policy objectives compared with economic outcomes. I felt it was 
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important to bolster this economic analysis with extensive background about Lula’s rise to power 
and existing causes of income inequality in Brazil in order to contextualize these economic 
changes. 
My thesis begins with background information on the importance of studying income 
inequality, and the negative ramifications of high-income inequality. I provide an overview of 
the significance of Lula’s election, as well as a brief discussion of the social and economic 
policies he introduced as president and how these policies encourage engagement with the 
formal sector. My thesis presents empirical analysis of variations in income inequality reduction 
across the different regions of the country. Through this research, I was able to observe how 
greatly income equality varied across different regions in Brazil and how different regions were 
markedly more successful at reducing income inequality. Finally, I conduct a regression analysis 
to determine the role of regional differences and engagement with the formal sector to analyze 
what factors contribute to the variations in income inequality reduction across municipalities.  
Through this research, it became apparent that despite a national trend of inequality 
reduction, this positive change did not impact all citizens of the country. In fact, it seemed to 
favor regions of the country with greater levels of capital and engagement with the formal sector 
development. My thesis results pave the way for future research on the factors that inhibit 
inequality reduction in Brazil. Furthermore, this thesis makes the case that with such variation 
across regions in levels of inequality, a national policy aimed to reduce income inequality must 
allow different regions and municipalities to customize their efforts to best fit the needs and 
issues facing their citizens.  
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes trends in income inequality reduction across different regions of 
Brazil from 2000 to 2010. This period was selected because it was a period of consistent 
economic growth and national inequality reduction, as measured by the GINI Index, as well as a 
period that witnessed the introduction of new government policies by President Lula da Silva. 
This thesis provides extensive background information about Lula’s presidency and income 
inequality in Brazil before conducting an economic analysis of the trends in income inequality 
reduction through the country. This thesis concludes that the trend of inequality reduction 
favored certain regions of the country and also favored municipalities that were more adept at 
encouraging participation in the formal sector. This means that although the North and 
Northeastern regions of the country received the highest amount of new government benefit 
payments, the regions were still less successful at reducing income inequality than the more 
historically wealthy regions of the country. The ramifications of this research show that although 
income inequality generally decreased during this time, greater national effort is needed to 
address the structural and historic factors that perpetuate regional inequality in Brazil.  
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 BACKGROUND  
In the field of economic development, Brazil’s progress in the first decade of the 21st 
century is often considered a model for how a country can achieve a development model that 
reduces poverty and promotes equality. Empirically this praise is warranted. In 1983, nearly half  
(49.3%) of Brazil’s citizens lived on under $3.10 a day and according to the most recent figures 
(2014) from the World Bank, only 7.56% of the countries citizens fell below this poverty line 
(World Bank). The GINI Index is a tool used by economists to measure relative inequality in a 
country by calculating how income is distributed amongst a country’s citizens. A nation with 
perfect equality would have a GINI Index of zero; meaning that every citizen has the same 
income, and a perfectly unequal nation would have a score of 100, meaning that one individual 
controls all of the income in the nation. Per the World Bank, in addition to reducing poverty 
levels, Brazil has also reduced income inequality from its all-time high GINI Index of 63.3 in 
1989 to 51.48 in 2014 (World Bank).  
Figure 1 
 
Source: World Bank 2017 
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Notably, the most sustained period of decline in inequality shown in Figure 1 occurred 
from 2001 to 2009 reflecting both an upswing in economic climate as well as a series of 
progressive social policies implemented by President Lula da Silva. The reductions Brazil 
witnessed in poverty and inequality were accompanied by major shifts in Brazil’s economic 
system as well as demographic structure. In the past 50 years the percentage of Brazilians living 
in urban areas has jumped significantly from 46% to 85% (World Bank). Figure 2 below 
demonstrates Brazil’s percent urban population compared to that of the United States, showing 
the extreme change the country has seen in urban-rural structure.  
Figure 2 
 
Source: World Bank 2017 
Of all the policies implemented by President Lula da Silva, Bolsa Família is the program 
that has gained the most international recognition. The program, which was introduced in 2003, 
is a conditional cash transfer program that combined previous welfare programs into a more 
cohesive program meant to alleviate the impacts of poverty on low-income Brazilians. 
Participants in the program must register in their respective municipality and adhere to certain 
program standards to continue to receive benefit payments. These standards include minimum 
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health and educational requirements for children, which will be discussed in the Bolsa Família 
section of this paper. Bolsa Família currently provides payments to 13.9 million Brazilian 
families, roughly one quarter of the country’s population (“Bolsa Família”). The success of this 
program has led many other countries to adopt condition cash transfer payment models in their 
national development plans. In 2004, the United Nations, World Bank, and Brazilian government 
launched the Brazil Learning Initiative for a World without Poverty to share the results and 
lessons Brazil learned from Bolsa Família with the rest of the world (“What is WWP?”).  
While Bolsa Família has generated results, and Brazil as a whole has seen reductions in 
poverty and inequality, the dialogue on Brazil’s development often stops there. At the most basic 
level, a decreasing GINI coefficient represents an increase in wages for low-income citizens, 
however, the formalization of the Brazilian labor market and other economic changes are less 
studied in academic literature on this time period. The purpose of this research is to shed light on 
the huge variation Brazil witnessed in inequality reduction across different regions and within 
regions of the country during the 2000 to 2010 timespan and to evaluate the historic and cultural 
factors that explain this variation. A one-size-fits-all poverty reduction plan, such as Bolsa 
Família, will inevitably have different levels of effectiveness based on existing structural and 
social norms within a given region. Across the 5,565 municipalities in Brazil, from 2000 to 2010, 
1133 saw no change or an increase in income inequality according to their respective GINI 
scores (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada et al.). In order to have a better understanding 
of Brazil’s economic and social development, it is important to look at results at between 
regions, acknowledging that inequality in the bustling metropolis of São Paulo has a different 
form than in a sparsely populated town in the Amazonas region of the country. This research 
begins with a broad literature review discussing the general body of knowledge on income 
   9 
inequality before focusing on the historical context of economic and social development in 
Brazil, the structure of Bolsa Família, and a statistical overview of inequality across Brazil. 
Finally, a brief economic analysis of the relationship between income inequality, regional 
inequity and formal employment in order to determine the impacts of Bolsa Família and formal 
employment on inequality reduction across Brazilian municipalities.  
Why Study Income Inequality? 
Inequality as a descriptive term is used to describe far more elements of quality of life 
than economic power alone. In Inequality Matters, by Prudence Carter and Sean Reardon, the 
four domains of socioeconomic, health, political, and sociocultural inequality and their 
relationships are analyzed in the greater discussion surrounding inequality in the United States. 
An individual’s access to financial capital, for example, can be limited by corrupt political 
structures within their country. Furthermore, if an individual is limited by certain health 
constraints, the ways they utilize financial capital will have a different impact on their wellbeing 
than it would for a healthy individual. This serves to explain that the conversation of inequality is 
far more complicated than the question of income levels alone. That being said, income 
inequality can serve as a metric that reflects other issues at play within a given society. It is also 
a more accessible tool that is easier to quantify than the prevailing attitudes or underlying social 
norms that shape a community. 
The relationship between economic growth and income inequality is often debated. Some 
level of income inequality is necessary to spur growth within an economy because certain 
individuals will have more capacity to create jobs and higher returns to investment if there is 
some level of imbalance in income distribution. However, if taken too far, income inequality can 
have negative ramifications for economic growth (Berg and Ostry 4). An IMF staff publication 
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by Andrew Berg and Jonathan Ostry discusses the relationship between sustained periods of 
economic growth and income inequality as measured by the GINI coefficient of different 
countries. Economic growth is not constant; there are periods where growth is extremely fast that 
are sometimes followed by a slow period of decline. In the long-term, a general trend of 
sustained growth is beneficial to reduce poverty levels in any given country (Berg and Ostry 3). 
This research concluded that nations with higher income inequality were likely to have more 
turbulent growth, meaning shorter cycles of growth and decline. These short cycles are an 
impediment to the sustained growth necessary for long-term poverty reduction (Antoine et al. 5). 
Income inequality can lead to changes in prevailing attitudes and social relationships 
within a country. Extreme income inequality can serve as a social indicator that is linked to 
higher levels of unhappiness. A study by Shigehiro Oishi, Selin Kesebir and Ed Diener revealed 
that in the United States, periods of higher levels of income inequality were correlated with 
higher levels of unhappiness. This research was conducted by comparing GINI coefficients with 
national survey responses regarding income level and happiness. The impacts of income 
inequality on unhappiness had the greatest impact on the poorest citizens in the country (Oishi et 
al. 1098). This is explained because as a general rule, income inequality as measured by a GINI 
coefficient will increase the most when wealthy individuals in a nation possess a greater share of 
the wealth compared to the poorest individuals. During a period with a higher GINI coefficient, 
the bottom quintile of a nation in terms of wealth will have less income, and thus less purchasing 
power than the top quintile. Most notably, this research determined the role of perceptions of 
inequality on levels of happiness. To measure perceptions of inequality, survey participants were 
asked to rank how trustworthy and how fair they perceived other individuals to be. During 
periods of increased income inequality, Americans perceived other individuals to be less fair and 
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less trustworthy than compared to periods of relative equality. Moreover, it was determined that 
for lower income individuals, the reduction in happiness resulting from periods of higher 
inequality was explained by these changed perceptions as opposed to changes in income (Oishi 
et al. 1098).  The strong association between inequality and perceptions of fairness show how 
high income inequality can lead to negative attitudes between social classes that 
disproportionally impacts lower classes. This sort of resentment weakens a community by 
preventing cohesion and the ability to work together towards a common goal.   
Inequality Matters outlines a few key areas where the current academic study of 
inequality is lacking. Most research on inequality is lumped within research on poverty, implying 
that the problem of inequality is a “problem of poverty” (Reardon and Carter 13). This leads to 
research questions that focus on topics such as “Why are people poor?” and “What are the effects 
of poverty?” Inequality Matters argues for placing a greater emphasis on the structural issues and 
ramifications of inequality within a society. This results in a new line of questioning: “Why is 
there so much inequality in socioeconomic conditions, health outcomes, and the distribution of 
political power?” and “What are the consequences of inequality for society?” Analysis through 
this framework allows for a better understanding of how inequality will lead to different 
outcomes and opportunities for different groups. Inequality is complex and intersectional. It is 
not simply the product of other issues in a country, but a system of cultural norms that builds 
upon itself. If the wealthiest, dominant group in a country controls the design of educational, 
health and media systems, those who fall outside of this dominant group will inevitably have 
more difficulty excelling in these systems and this contributes to persistent inequity.  
By studying income inequality we can arrive to a further understanding of structural 
inefficiencies within a given society. It is important to keep in mind that income inequality 
   12 
should be interpreted as an indicator of other inefficiencies. Racial, political, and cultural 
inequalities are all intertwined with income. Next we will explore the recent history of inequality 
in different regions of Brazil and efforts to reduce poverty. 
Country Context during Lula Election  
 The 2002 election of President Lula da Silva marked a radical change for Brazilian 
politics and an era of representation for the impoverished population long ignored in the political 
sphere. For most of Brazilian history, a disproportionate amount of political power, and a 
disproportionate percentage of the country’s wealthy, white population existed in the South and 
Southeast of the country (Telles 166). Lula’s Workers’ Party, a leftist party dedicated to social 
progress, openly criticized Brazilian political norms and injustices of the state against its people 
(“Nossa História”). The figure of Lula alone, a man born in the rural Northeast of Brazil with no 
college education, symbolized that it was time for a change. This change would entail targeted 
efforts at improving quality of life for Brazilians, by reducing poverty and inequality and 
advocating for improved health, education, and human rights for all (“Nossa História”). The 
party promised to defend the worker, while also promoting the economic growth necessary to lift 
the country out of poverty. Lula was able to create ethos in his campaign rhetoric by drawing 
upon his own past as a factory worker. The promises of this campaign had a particularly strong 
appeal to citizens in the Northeast and North of the country, two regions that had historically 
higher rates of poverty than the rest of the nation, and two regions that had less influence in 
shaping Brazilian politics.  
 In terms of inequality, Lula was presented with not only the issue of income inequality 
hindering economic growth, but also serious issues of race and gender inequality that had long 
been pushed aside by politicians. Income inequality in Brazil is not just an economic 
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phenomenon, it is a product of racial inequality and a systematic oppression of black and 
indigenous peoples and these issues have ramifications at the national level as well as the local 
level. High national income inequality reflected the major disparity in wealth in the nation as a 
whole, with the South and Southeast possessing a disproportionate amount of the nation’s wealth 
and the North and Northeastern regions becoming associated with poverty. In terms of GDP 
generation, the North and Northeast respectively generated just 4.5% and 13.1% of the nation’s 
total GDP in 1998 and both regions had a GDP per capita close to half of GDP per capita in the 
Southeast region at the time of Lula’s candidacy (Lemos 14). While large cities boomed in 
southern regions of the country spurring further growth, the North and Northeast were slower to 
develop and continued to have significantly higher levels of poverty than other regions of the 
country. The Northeast in particular was slower to industrialize and had a large proportion of 
informal economic activity (Telles 144). In addition to having higher levels of poverty, the North 
and Northeast have historically struggled with high income inequality as a byproduct of the 
slavery systems that shaped the development of these regions.  
At the local level, Brazil, a nation whose history is inextricably linked to slavery and the 
plantation system, struggled to negotiate formal space for black, indigenous, and female 
Brazilians after the official abolition of slavery in 1888. Due to this failure to construct formal 
space for all population groups, income inequality was not just a macro-economic issue creating 
a north-south dichotomy, but an issue that had a large effect on daily life for the majority of 
Brazilians. Under the slavery system, white men held property and wealth, and this same landed 
class made political decisions, meaning a lack of power and land for anyone who didn’t fit into 
this dominant plantation-master ideal. This helped contribute to a pattern of high-income 
inequality and disparate distribution of resources and wealth within Brazilian towns and cities 
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that continued into industrialization. Within these restrictive confines, Brazilians were able to 
create creative communities that were self-sustaining without formal support or government 
recognition, however economic measures cannot often quantify these intangible traits. From the 
1950’s onward, rapid urbanization in Brazil contributed to the development of an informal 
economy and informal settlements in cities characterized by a lack of official property rights and 
employment in the informal sector. These informal settlements, favelas, are surrounded by 
extreme stigma despite the major contributions they provide to Brazilian society (Perlman 8). 
Historically negative perceptions of marginalized individuals by the state and vice versa 
contribute to the framework of national development in Brazil.  
A study of Brazilian development would be misguided if it overlooked the crucial role of 
the informal economy. However, a national development plan, such as the one promoted by Lula 
and the Workers’ Party by nature requires some level of formality and increased interactions 
between citizens and the state. In order to make his impact, Lula had to work to renegotiate how 
citizens viewed the government and incentivize participation in the formal sector.  
Precedent for Social Programs 
Prior to the late 20th century, the development of government welfare programs in 
modern Brazil was largely suppressed by frequent regime changes and the lack of a political 
process focused on social development. In the absence of government welfare programs, social 
protection was linked to the formal labor market, privileging the status of primarily white 
workers and providing little assistance to the rest of the population. The introduction of the 
democratic government outlined in the 1988 constitution paved the way for a new series of social 
protection policies. Before this point, the only existing form of welfare was a pension program 
for rural workers (Soares 3). The 1988 constitution established the national social security 
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program, Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC), which provides a benefit payment to 
elderly Brazilians living below the poverty level as well as Brazilians with deficiencies. The 
BPC program still provides payments to millions of Brazilians.  
In 1991, as poverty started to gain recognition as an issue that the government needed to 
address, Senator Eduardo Suplicy proposed a bill to provide transfer payments to citizens earning 
less than minimum wage. This proposal did not pass the senate, but four years later, three 
different cities would introduce their own versions of conditional cash transfer programs (CCT), 
starting a new wave of social welfare programs. Brazil introduced its first national CCT program 
in 1996, which focused on the eradication of child labor, by providing different transfer 
payments to urban and rural households. This program was followed by a program that provided 
cash transfers for families meeting school attendance requirements, and another cash transfer that 
included the same school attendance requirements but added the conditionality that families 
would have to get children younger than six vaccinated. In the meantime, many Brazilian cities 
continued to implement their own CCT programs. In 2003, President Lula introduced a fourth 
national cash transfer program, Cartão Alimentação, which provided a transfer payment that 
could be used exclusively to buy food. These programs were all run by different agencies, 
meaning it would be possible for a family to receive over four different benefit payments, or 
none, if they had not applied to receive them. This confusion and administrative difficulty 
ultimately was overcome with the introduction of Bolsa Família, which could be best described 
as the reorganization and expansion of extant ideas about welfare and poverty reduction (Soares 
4). The 6.7 million families registered under other CCT programs were incorporated into Bolsa 
Família, which set a national target to cover 11 million families by 2006 (Soares 6). By 
introducing Bolsa Família, Brazil was able to eliminate redundant benefits and create an 
   16 
organized means for vulnerable families to access payments they needed.  
 
POLICY REFORM UNDER LULA DA SILVA 
Labor Reform 
True to the campaign platform, Lula and the Workers’ Party advocated for and created 
many laws to empower working class Brazilians. Many of the advances experienced by working 
class Brazilians were negotiated through the work of labor unions, which were supported through 
the National Labor Fourm (Almeida 55). During his two terms as president, Lula consistently 
raised the minimum wage. From 2003 to 2014 under the Workers’ Party, minimum wage in 
Brazil increased by 76.2% (Weisbrot et al. 3). This major increase in minimum salary can help to 
explain why income growth for low-income citizens in Brazil outpaced income growth of high-
income citizens during the Lula presidency, helping to shrink the nation’s income gap. However, 
a minimum wage can only guarantee higher wages for individuals employed in the formal sector, 
which in some municipalities is as low as one third of working age individuals (Instituto de 
Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada et al.). The protections extended to workers under Lula went 
beyond the employed population; from 2003 to 2012, the amount of Brazilians covered by 
unemployment insurance increased by 99.2%  (Summa 12). After a brief period of decline, the 
increased negotiating power of labor unions helped contribute to increases in real salaries across 
all sectors after 2006 (Summa 18). Overall, at the end of Lula’s presidency in 2010, the income 
of Brazilians employed in the formal sector was higher and more secure than when he took 
office. Furthermore, increases in participation in the formal sector meant that more and more 
Brazilians could benefit from these economic protections.  
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Other Social Programs 
Before discussing Bolsa Família and the significance of the program for inequality 
reduction in Brazil, it is important to recognize that Bolsa Família, while perhaps the most 
recognized program, was not the only policy implemented by Lula aimed to reduce national 
inequality and it should be studied within the greater context of the Lula presidency. Various 
other programs contributed to the battle against inequality, even if they did not do so in the form 
of a cash payment. To empower groups such as women, indigenous peoples, and afro-Brazilians 
long unrecognized in Brazilian politics, Lula created new cabinet positions, such as the Secretary 
of Policies for the Promotion of Racial Equality and a Secretary of Policies for Women. The 
importance of state recognition of property rights was another crucial element of the Lula 
presidency, including the recognition of informal Quilombo communities. However, registering 
property with the government does not exclusively bring advantages to inhabitants. With formal 
recognition of ownership comes new taxes, placing a greater burden on low-income citizens.  
Bolsa Família  
Bolsa Família was introduced in 2003 with the objective of combating hunger and 
poverty through a cash transfer payment for the nation’s poorest citizens. This benefit payment 
was meant to guarantee the basic rights of health, education, social assistance, and food security 
so that families would be able to exit their situation of vulnerability. The program targets poverty 
both in the short and long term. In the short term, families can use the transfer payments to 
alleviate the immediate needs of poverty such as hunger. In the long term, the conditionalities of 
Bolsa Família aim to break the cycle of poverty by ensuring that children receive an education 
and medical treatment. As poverty rates are much higher in the North and Northeast of the 
nation, these regions have the highest share of program participants (IPEA).  
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While the primary objective of Bolsa Família was poverty reduction, the program is 
perhaps Brazil’s greatest national effort to reduce inequality and the program is credited for 
anywhere from one-fifth to one-third of the reduction in income inequality that occurred from 
2001 to 2004 (Soares 20). Bolsa aims to reduce income inequality through the premise that 
education is the factor that separates the wealthiest and poorest citizens in a nation; if poor 
citizens can receive the same education, the gap between the two classes will shrink. The cash 
transfers and conditionalities of Bolsa Família also promote the reduction of social inequalities 
by guaranteeing that all children have access to the education and health resources necessary for 
their personal wellbeing. If children are healthy and well educated, they will be able to contribute 
to the workforce and society as a whole in order to improve their quality of life.  
Administration of Bolsa Família 
 While Bolsa Família is a national program, it is administered at the municipal level, 
meaning that the responsibilities of managing the program are delegated to the local government. 
In order to receive benefits, individuals must have a government issued ID, which they will then 
present to their municipal government so they can be registered in the Cadastro Único system. 
Cadastro Único is the federal system, which keeps track of all beneficiaries and the payments 
they should receive. Eligibility for Bolsa Família is determined through the Ministry of Social 
Development based on the income level registered in the Cadastro Único system. Families who 
are considered to live in extreme poverty or poverty are eligible for the program. One unique 
element of Bolsa Família is that eligibility is determined at the household level as opposed to the 
individual level, meaning the average income of all individuals in a home is used as opposed to 
just the income of one parent.  
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The following income requirements are used to determine program eligibility: 
• Extreme Poverty: Monthly income per family member between R$0 and R$85 
($27.50)  
• Poverty: Monthly income per family member between R$85.01 ($27.51) and R$170 
($54.90)  
 
The amount of benefit a family receives depends on the family’s income level as well as family 
characteristics. Families classified in situations of extreme poverty are the primary targets for the 
program and thus eligible for the largest amount of benefits. Families with children and 
expecting mothers are able to receive additional benefits.  
 
Program benefits are broken down into the following three categories: 
• Basic Benefit: R$85 ($27.50) monthly exclusively for families classified in extreme 
poverty 
 
• Variable Benefit: Up to five separate payments of R$39 ($12.50) monthly for each 
family member in the following subcategories  
o Children between 0 and fifteen years old 
o Pregnant women 
o Infants between 0 and six months old 
 
• Adolescent Variable Benefit: Up to two payments of R$46 ($14.70) monthly for each 
family member between the ages of sixteen and seventeen ("Bolsa Família") 
 
Based on the limitations of the number of benefits receivable, the maximum amount a family can 
receive from the Basic, Variable and Adolescent Variable payments is limited to R$372.00 
($119) per month. An additional payment is available to families in situations of extreme poverty 
entitled Benefit to Overcome Extreme Poverty. Eligibility for his benefit is determined based on 
family income after Bolsa Família transfer payments are included.  
 Bolsa Família is a conditional cash transfer model, which means that participants must 
adhere to program regulations in order to continue receiving payments. This creates a dual-
system of accountability in which participants must abide by program requirements and the local 
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government must provide all necessary services for participants. The program requirements 
encourage the following positive health and educational practices.  
• Health Conditionalities:  
o Maintain vaccinations for children between zero and seven years of age 
o Attend pre-natal consultations (pregnant women) 
o Participate in educational programs about breast-feeding and healthy eating 
(women who breast-feed) 
 
• Education Conditionalities 
o School attendance rates of at least 85% for children between six and fifteen years 
old 
o School attendance rates of at least 75% for adolescents between sixteen and 
seventeen years old ("Bolsa Família”) 
 
While the value of the benefit payments has steadily increased over time to reflect changes in 
cost of living, the program has undergone relatively few changes since its inception. The 
program has consistently increased in enrollment since its inception.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Bolsa Família 
The impact of Bolsa Família and the structure of the program have been extensively 
analyzed in academic literature. In general, the program is considered to be a success in terms of 
clear improvements to school and health participation of program participants for a relatively 
small investment on behalf of the government (under 1% of the nation’s GDP) (Soares 6). 
However, the objectives of the program raise some important questions. According to Sergei 
Soares of the Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic Research, Bolsa Família rides the line 
between a social protection program and an opportunity-generating program, which means that 
the program does not truly accomplish either goal (Soares 9). Conditionalities imply that the cash 
transfer is not is not a guarantee of income protection for all low income Brazilians, meaning that 
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it does not offer total social protection. Moreover, while school attendance and basic health are 
crucial for poverty reduction, the conditionalities set by Bolsa Família are not particularly 
difficult for families to achieve and they do little to increase capacity of program participants. In 
order for Bolsa Família to generate opportunities for participants, Soares argues it would need to 
provide either some sort of career training or incentivize higher education. Furthermore, the 
transfer payments provided by Bolsa Família are relatively small. Using a poverty line of R$120, 
Bolsa Família only caused an 8% reduction in the percentage of the population living in poverty. 
However, the program did cause an 18% reduction in the nation’s poverty gap because the 
transfer payment was enough to increase the income of some families to over the poverty line 
(Sátyro and Soares 27).  
Partially attributed to Bolsa Família, Brazil witnessed major improvements to school 
enrollment rates from 2000 to 2010. From 2005 to 2010, the percentage of six year olds enrolled 
in primary school increased from 83% to 92% (Chavez 7). School attendance amongst program 
participants has also increased by about 3.6% since the program’s inception (Chavez 7). The 
conformity of program participants to school attendance conditionalities is more effectively 
monitored than abidance to health conditionalities, and by 2010, the federal government was able 
to monitor the school attendance of over 85% of program participants (Soares 10). One major 
criticism of Bolsa Família outlined by Chavez regarding the program’s education conditionality 
is the fact that increasing school attendance does not necessarily increase the quality of education 
that students receive. The program does not provide extra funding to schools in low-income 
areas with high program participation and student achievement can be restricted in this way. If 
education is in fact the key to inequality reduction, as Bolsa Família organizers claim, it seems 
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that greater investment in reducing educational inequity should be the next logical step in 
Brazil’s social policy development.  
One fear often associated with social welfare programs is the concern that individuals 
will forgo working and searching for employment and choose to sustain themselves from 
government payments. This topic is particularly interesting in the realm of Bolsa Família, 
through which the maximum possible monthly payment receivable is only about one third of 
monthly minimum wage, meaning that Bolsa Família participation alone is not enough to allow 
a family to live comfortably. In order to receive transfer payments from the program, a family 
must actively register with their municipality and present appropriate government issued 
identification. To receive a greater transfer payment these individuals would then have to lie 
about their income levels, concealing income generated from the informal sector. Because Bolsa 
Família does not provide enough income to stop working altogether, participation in the program 
could incentivize participation in the informal sector as opposed to the formal sector. However, 
to date, research does not indicate that Bolsa Família participation has a major impact on labor 
force participation, refuting the claims of critics of the program (Soares 25). 
There is increasing literature measuring the positive social effects of Bolsa Família 
beyond the program’s conditionalities, including positive impacts on female empowerment and 
eliminating aspects of social isolation associated with poverty. For women who receive Bolsa 
Família on behalf of their families, the process of registering with the municipal government by 
presenting government issued IDs can signify a greater level of civic engagement. This increased 
civic engagement provides greater autonomy to women, and female participants in Bolsa  
Família feel more independent and able to care for their families (Paes-Sousa and Rômulo 149). 
The positive social impacts extend to the community as well and recent research aims to quantify 
   23 
the positive spillovers of the program. Research conducted in São Paulo has determined that 
Bolsa Família participation has positive impacts on crime reduction, particularly with crimes 
related to income such as theft and robberies (Chioda et al. 1).  
Inequality Reduction  
 Perhaps because the program is unique to Brazil, the role of Bolsa Família in income 
inequality reduction has received a significant amount of attention in the international 
community. While Bolsa Família may represent a key part of inequality reduction in Brazil, 
economic changes had a far greater influence on this process simply because income inequality 
is a reflection of the distribution of wealth in a country. An extensive report on income inequality 
reduction by the Brazilian IPEA in 2007 studies the change in income inequality in the nation 
from 1998 to 2005 and this report is able to observe the changes that occur as a result of the 
implementation of Bolsa Família in 2003. According to this report, 66% of the reduction in the 
nation’s GINI score during this time period is attributed to changes in total income from work 
(Barros et al. 39). The calculations done by the IPEA attribute 23.7% of the GINI reduction in 
this time period to increases in government transfer payments including Bolsa Família. 
Unfortunately, due to limited data this report was not able to determine the effects of transfer 
payments in the Northern region of the country. The report did determine that during the first 
years of Bolsa Família, the program had a significantly higher impact on income inequality 
reduction in the Northeast of the country. Particularly, from 2002 to 2004, transfer payments 
(including Bolsa Família) were accredited with 87% of the reduction in per capita GINI 
coefficients in the Northeast (Barros et al. 39). Per this study, other regions did not even attribute 
one-third of per capita income inequality reduction to transfer payments, which shows the high 
importance of Bolsa Família participation in the Northeast (Barros et al. 38).  
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 From 2001 to 2005, the Brazilian marketplace progressed towards more equal pay for 
men and women as well and black and white employees. In 2001, men received an average 
salary 58.1% greater than females with the same qualifications, but this gap reduced by two 
percentage points by 2005. The disparity between salaries of male and female workers is greater 
than the disparity between black and white workers in Brazil, but race unfortunately plays a part 
in determining an individual’s expected salary. From 2001 to 2005 the percent difference of 
earnings received by white workers compared to black workers decreased by roughly two 
percentage points from 12.9% to 11% (Barros et al. 379). These changes in salary based on race 
and gender helped contribute to greater equality and more equal opportunities for employees in 
the Brazilian labor force during this time, but only corresponded to 9% total of the decrease in 
income inequality derived from income from working (Barros et al. 391). 
In addition to more egalitarian pay across different races and gender, a diverse range of 
factors were responsible for increases in equality in income derived from work. These factors 
include increased geographic equality (minimizing payment differences between urban and rural 
municipalities) as more equal pay across sectors. Of all the factors mentioned thus far, 
geographic equality had the biggest impact on inequality reduction, contributing to 22% of the 
reduction in inequality in income derived from work. Despite advances in other aspects, one area 
where Brazil struggled to make improvements was the differential between salaries of those 
employed in the formal and informal sectors. Under the Lula administration, the proportion of 
workers participating in the informal sector declined, indicating progress towards higher 
economic development. However, since 1996, and including the first years of the Lula 
administration up to 2005, the differential in salary between workers employed formally and 
informally continued to rise. From 2001 to 2005, the percentage of salary formal sector workers 
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earn over informal sector workers increased from 36.4% to 40.6% (Barros et al. 384). Due to the 
growing disparity between the informal and formal sectors from 2001 to 2005, changes in formal 
employment in this time period were actually associated with an increase in income inequality.  
Finally, increasing minimum salary is a tool that when used effectively is proven to have 
the ability to reduce income inequality within a country. In Brazil, workers in the formal sector 
earning minimum wage benefitted from the salary increases implemented by the Lula 
administration. However, from 2001 to 2005 while minimum salary increased, so did the number 
of Brazilians receiving less than minimum salary (Barros et al. 485). In Brazil, the third decile of 
the population in terms of income is the group that receives a salary equal to or close to 
minimum wage, and approximately 20% of citizens earn less than minimum wage. From 2001 to 
2005, the income of Brazilians in the bottom quintile of the population decreased relative to 
minimum wages, meaning the most vulnerable citizens did not benefit from this policy change. 
This is particularly apparent in the Northeastern region of the country, where approximately 40% 
of the workforce receives a salary below minimum wage (Afonso et al. 572).  
 
DATA ANALYIS 
As outlined in the literature review sections of this paper, the factors that contributed 
changes in income inequality in Brazil during the Lula administration (Bolsa Família, minimum 
wage increases, and formal economic growth) have different levels of effectiveness in different 
areas. For example, in a large city such as São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro, an increase in minimum 
wage will have less impact on income inequality because this increase is smaller relative to the 
large amount of wealth possessed by the top quintile of the population. Thus, by exclusively 
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looking at Brazil’s national GINI score, it is easy to overlook regional trends in inequality 
reduction. 
The Lula administration created many policies designed to empower workers and 
eliminate national poverty, however, these programs by their nature as state run programs favor 
participation in the formal sector. The government is unable to provide formal protections to 
workers operating without an official work license or a government issued ID card and data 
shows that Brazil is becoming a less profitable nation for those working in the informal sector. 
Even Bolsa Família, a program that provides a transfer payment to low-income Brazilians 
regardless of if they are employed in the formal or informal sector, favors adherence to a certain 
government norm; Bolsa Família beneficiaries must have an ID card and register in person with 
their municipal government before they can even be considered to receive payments. 
Municipalities across Brazil are extremely different in terms of their size, geography, and socio-
economic composition and this same variation extends to municipal governments. By placing 
program administration in the hands of local governments with varying levels of organization 
and sophistication, the efficiency of Bolsa Família distribution is subject to variation as well. 
This thesis hypothesizes that inequality reduction in Brazil during the Lula administration 
would favor municipalities that were more effectively able to organize participation and 
engagement with the formal sector. This implies that municipalities with higher formal 
employment participation rates would be the same municipalities that were the most effective at 
administrating Bolsa Família and other government programs, thus causing greater reductions in 
income inequality.  
To test this theory, data were sourced from the Brazilian Applied Economics Research 
Institute, Fundação João Pinheiro, and United Nations Development Program’s 2013 study of 
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municipal development in Brazil, The Atlas of Human Development, which covers a wide range 
of standard of living indicators from education levels to population across Brazilian 
municipalities (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada et al.). The data in this report were 
based on the results of the 1991, 2000, and 2010 censuses, which were administered by the 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. For purposes of this research, the results of the 
2000 and 2010 census were compared to show changes during Lula’s presidency, which lasted 
from 2003 to 2010. Additional data on Bolsa Família participation were also accessed from the 
Brazilian Applied Economics Research Institute (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada). 
Data on Bolsa Família are taken annually, based on the number or beneficiaries and total 
payments in every December starting in the year 2004. Census data are taken at the individual 
level while all data on Bolsa Família are taken at the household level. Only the 5,565 
municipalities with consistent data for both the 2000 and 2010 census were studied in this 
research.  
Empirical Overview of Inequality Reduction 
In order to understand this line of research, it is important to address a gap in the scholarly 
literature on income inequality reduction by providing an empirical overview of the high 
variation municipalities across Brazil witnessed in inequality reduction. As aforementioned, from 
2000 to 2010, 1,133 municipalities (approximately 20% of the total number) in Brazil saw no 
improvements to income inequality, signifying the GINI coefficients of these municipalities 
either remained the same or increased during this period. On average, municipalities in the North 
and Northeast were less effective at reducing income inequality than the rest of the country. 
From 2000 to 2010, income inequality increased or remained the same in 159 of 449 (35.4%) of 
municipalities in the North, 492 of 1794 (27.4%) municipalities in the Northeast, 227 of 1,668 
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(13.6%) municipalities in the Southeast, 171 of 1,188 municipalities in the South (14.4%) and 84 
of 466 (18%) municipalities in the Central-West. The following table (Table 1) shows the 
average municipal GINI coefficient for Brazil’s five regions and the nation as a whole.  
 
Table 1 
Region 2000 Municipal 
GINI Average 
2010 Municipal 
GINI Average 
Change in Municipal  
GINI Average  
Brazil 
 
0.5471 0.4944 -0.05268 
North 0.5992 0.5677 -0.03154 
Northeast 0.5619 0.5251 -0.03681 
Southeast 0.5295 0.4659 -0.06362 
South 0.5237 0.4599 -0.06386 
Central- 
West 
0.5617 0.4953 -0.06648 
    
 
On average, municipalities in Brazil reduced their GINI coefficients by slightly over 0.05 
from 2000 to 2010. The data revealed that the North and Northeastern regions of the country had 
the highest income inequality at the time of the 2000 census. Despite high rates of participation 
in government programs such as Bolsa Família, these regions were also less effective at reducing 
income inequality than the rest of the nation. Not only was percent reduction in municipal GINI 
smaller in the North and Northeast, but total reduction in income inequality was smaller in these 
regions as well. This chart shows that municipalities in the southern region of the country had the 
lowest average income inequality across both time periods. The Central-Western region of the 
country was the winner in terms of inequality reduction, witnessing the greatest decrease in 
average income inequality. As shown in Table 2 below, there was high variation within regions 
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in terms of income inequality reduction, and the Central-West and North had the largest standard 
deviations for this metric.  
 
Table 2 
Region Standard Deviation of GINI 
Reduction 
North 0.0759 
Northeast 0.0617 
Southeast 0.0597 
South 0.0664 
Central-West 0.0794 
 
In order to visualize income inequality reduction at the state level, the following map 
(Figure 3) represents the average municipal GINI coefficient reduction of Brazil’s 26 states and 
federal district, Brasilia. These scores were then broken down into five quintiles, in which the 5th 
quintile saw the greatest reduction in income inequality from 2000 to 2010 and the 1st quintile 
saw the least reduction in income inequality.  
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Figure 3 
 
 It is worth noting that on average, municipalities in the states of Acre, Amapá, Roraima 
actually saw a slight increase in income inequality during this time period and that income 
inequality in Brasilia remained constant. The three states where income inequality increased are 
all located in the North of the country. In the rest of the nation, average municipal income 
inequality decreased at varying levels. Santa Catarina and Paraná, two states in the South of 
Brazil saw the greatest average decrease in income inequality; with reductions of over .07 to 
their respective GINI coefficients.  
 The averages conducted in this analysis were based on average municipal scores, without 
weighting results for population size of the respective municipalities. Municipalities in extremely 
large cities tended to have significantly less improvement in income inequality than the national 
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average. Thusly, adjusting state-level GINI averages for municipal population size has a greater 
impact on states such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo which both possess mega-cities that saw 
increases in income inequality. As Brazil is a highly urbanized nation that continues to urbanize, 
it is important to address the issue of urban inequality and analyze federal policies for their 
effectiveness in urban areas. For reference, the 2000 and 2010 GINI coefficients of the largest 
cities in each Brazilian State are included in the attached appendix.  
Correlation Analysis 
 The preliminary empirical analysis revealed that the North and Northeastern regions were 
much less successful at reducing income inequality than other regions in the nation. As these 
regions also had higher income inequality in 2000, this led to the concern that municipalities 
with high income inequality in 2000 were actually less likely to reduce their income inequality in 
2010. To test this concern the correlation between the 2000 GINI scores and change in GINI 
scores was calculated.  
 
Correlation(2000 GINI coefficient, Δ GINI coefficient from 2000 to 2010) = -.5227 
 
The strong negative relationship between these values indicates that municipalities with higher 
2000 GINI coefficients saw a greater decrease in their respective GINI scores from 2000 to 2010. 
Generally, this means that income inequality reduction was the strongest in the municipalities of 
Brazil that needed it the most. However, municipalities with above average income inequality in 
the North and Northeast were less effective at reducing income inequality than their counterparts 
in other regions of the country.  
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To test the hypothesis that successful inequality reduction was connected to 
formalization, the relationship between income inequality and formal employment was 
calculated.  
 
Correlation(2000 GINI coefficient,  Δ % Formal Employment from 2000 to 2010) = -.0882 
Correlation(Δ GINI coefficient from 2000 to 2010,  Δ % Formal Employment from 2000 to 
2010) = -.0815 
 
These values show that formal employment is associated with a slightly greater capacity to 
reduce income inequality. Municipalities with high-income inequality in 2000 were less able to 
increase the percent of the labor force employed in the formal sector. Additionally, the negative 
relationship between the change in a municipality’s GINI coefficient and the change in its 
percent of workers employed in the formal sector shows that a greater decrease in income 
inequality corresponded to a greater increase in formal sector employment.  
 To test the relationship between Bolsa Família administrative effectiveness and 
inequality reduction, this research posited that municipalities that were less effective at 
implementing the program would be slower to arrive to their target number of recipients due to 
poor advertising of the program and weak implementation mechanisms. Within the confines of 
the available data, the annual change in total program participation is used to indicate how 
effectively Bolsa Família was introduced in different municipalities. A municipality that was 
less effective at registering program participants would see a greater increase in families 
registered in the program after the first year of the program. To test this, municipal level 
participation in the first years of the Bolsa Família program was contrasted with the municipal 
level data on income inequality in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Relationship Between Municipal Bolsa Família Participation and Income Inequality  
 
Correlation(2000 GINI Coefficient, Δ Number 
of Families Registered in Bolsa Família from 
2004 to 2005) = 0.1211 
 
Correlation(2010 GINI Coefficient, Δ Number 
of Families Registered in Bolsa Família from 
2004 to 2005) = 0.1853 
 
 
Correlation(2000 GINI Coefficient, Δ Number 
of Families Registered in Bolsa Família from 
2004 to 2006) = 0.1316 
 
 
Correlation(2010 GINI Coefficient, Δ Number 
of Families Registered in Bolsa Família from 
2004 to 2006) = 0.2070 
 
Correlation(2000 GINI Coefficient, Δ Number 
of Families Registered in Bolsa Família from 
2004 to 2007) = 0.1322 
 
 
Correlation(2010 GINI Coefficient, Δ Number 
of Families Registered in Bolsa Família from 
2004 to 2007) = 0.2089 
 
Supporting the hypothesis, results of these tests show that a higher initial GINI coefficient 
corresponded with a greater increase in program participation in the first years of the Bolsa 
Família program. Furthermore, this research also shows that municipalities that were slower to 
reach their target number of program participants tended to have a higher GINI score in 2010, 
meaning that municipalities that were less successful in implementing the program had less 
improvement to income inequality. While further tests are necessary to prove causation, the 
results of this preliminary research shows that poor municipal organization could be an 
impediment to inequality reduction, meaning that inequality reduction favors municipalities with 
stronger infrastructures.  
 Finally, economic change and increasing power to workers were responsible for a large 
amount of the progress made towards income equality in Brazil during Lula’s administration. As 
Brazil is transitioning to a primarily service based economy, the role of this transition in income 
inequality should be studied. To test this relationship, the correlation between changes in 
participation in the service sector was contrasted to changes in municipal level income 
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inequality. The metric used was the percent of employees per municipality employed in the 
service sector.  
Correlation(Δ GINI 2000 to 2010, Δ % employed in service sector 2000 to  2010) 
= 0.1118 
 
A greater increase in service sector employment corresponded to a greater increase in income 
inequality. This could be because a higher service sector employment share, which is a feature of 
growing urban regions, means incomes will rise for some workers, but the benefits of growing 
urbanization do not spread to the poorer population. 
Regression Analysis 
 To understand the major determinants in inequality reduction across Brazil, and the role 
of the formal sector and economic growth in this process, I formulated a linear regression model 
using R software with observations from 5,503 municipalities with recorded data from the Atlas 
of Human Development and municipal level GDP data from the IBGE (IBGE).  Data regarding 
Bolsa Família were excluded from the model due to a lack of recorded data for a substantial 
number of municipalities. The formula for this model estimates the predicted change in GINI 
score (2010 GINI - 2000 GINI) based on municipal characteristics. As a fall in income inequality 
is shown by a lower 2010 than 2000 GINI score, in this model, negative coefficients correspond 
to a greater reduction in income inequality. The following specification was used: 
 
Change in GINI = origgini + origform + changeform + changeservice + isnorth + isnortheast + 
issouth + issoutheast + rawgdpchange 
 
 
The variable origgini corresponds to the municipality’s 2000 GINI score, origform corresponds 
to the municipality’s level of formal employment, measured as the percent of the workforce 
employed in the formal sector. Changeform is the change in the percent of workers in the formal 
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sector, and changeservice is the change in the percent of workers employed in the service sector 
from 2000 to 2010. Rawgdpchange is the change in municipal average GDP per capita from 
2000 to 2010. Finally, isnorth, isnortheast, issouth, and issoutheast are dummy variables for the 
different regions of Brazil. Thus, a municipality that receives a score of 0 for all four of these 
regional criteria would be a municipality in the last remaining region of the country, the Central-
West. The regression model yielded the following results: 
Table 4 
Coefficients: Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept) .3202  7.120e-03 44.979   < 2e-16 *** 
originalgini - .6443  1.053e-02 -61.198   < 2e-16 *** 
originalformalemp - .0004617  5.536e-05   -8.340   < 2e-16 *** 
changeformal - .0008676 8.296e-05 -10.459   < 2e-16 *** 
changeservice .0007963  1.313e-04    6.063 1.42e-09 *** 
isnorth .04722 3.439e-03   13.728   < 2e-16 *** 
isnortheast .01757 2.818e-03    6.235 4.85e-10 *** 
issouth - .01989 2.837e-03   -7.011 2.65e-12 *** 
issoutheast - .01558 2.710e-03   -5.747 9.60e-09 *** 
rawgdpchange .0000001803 6.758e-08    2.668   0.00766 ** 
 
Significance levels:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05  
 
Residual standard error: 0.04951 on 5493 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.4385, Adjusted R-squared:  0.4376 
F-statistic: 476.7 on 9 and 5493 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 
   36 
All coefficients were statistically significant, indicating that the effect of each of these estimates 
differed from 0. Municipalities with high levels of formal employment in 2000 were shown to 
have a larger decrease in income inequality. Furthermore, an increase in formal employment 
participation was associated with a greater decrease in income inequality. This is likely due to 
the increases in protections and wages for formal sector employees introduced during Lula’s 
presidency, such as higher minimum wages. Municipalities more equipped to engage with the 
formal sector would be able to reap more of the rewards of these programs.  
As shown in the Correlation Analysis section of this paper, a higher initial GINI score 
corresponds with a greater decrease in income inequality; meaning municipalities with high 
income inequality in 2000 saw the most improvements during this time period.  While income 
inequality reduction varied greatly during this period, as a general rule, the municipalities that 
had the greatest need to improve saw the most improvement, indicating a successful trend in 
inequality reduction for the nation as a whole. 
Increased service sector participation and increased GDP per capita, two factors 
associated with economic development, were shown to be impediments to income inequality 
reduction in Brazil. This implies that if GDP increases are not distributed to lower income 
members of a society, there will be little improvement to income inequality as a result of this 
economic development. Moreover, as Brazil transitions to a service based economy, the 
relationship between service sector participation and income inequality must be monitored.  
Finally, the regional variables in this regression model reveal differing levels of success 
in inequality reduction across the five different regions of Brazil. Despite having access to the 
same government programs and a general trend of economic growth, municipalities in the North 
are estimated to have .04722 less GINI reduction than those in the control group (Central-West) 
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and municipalities in the Northeast saw .01757 less reduction. The regression model revealed 
encouraging results for municipalities in the South and Southeast, which are estimated to have 
.01989 and .01558 greater income inequality reduction, respectively, than the control group. 
Thusly, the regions of Brazil with the greatest levels of wealth and a lower regional average 
GINI score in 2000 saw the greatest improvements to income inequality. This means that a 
municipality with a high 2000 GINI score would be predicted to have a greater decrease in 
income inequality if it were in the South or Southeast than if it were in the North or Northeast. 
The results of this model show that while as a general rule income inequality decreased, the 
variation between regions in inequality reduction may affirm the need for greater policy 
interventions in the North and Northeast.  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The pronounced income inequality and poverty reduction Brazil accomplished under the 
Lula administration merits careful study. However, the findings of this research confirm that 
nationally instituted programs such as minimum wage laws and government transfer payments 
may be met with different levels of success at the regional level. Furthermore, despite all the 
innovative programs introduced during this time, approximately one-fifth of Brazilian 
municipalities did not reduce income inequality. Among the myriad of reasons income inequality 
should have reduced under the Lula administration, it is almost more noteworthy that so many 
municipalities failed to make improvements in this regard. The overall pattern of inequality 
reduction in Brazil is uplifting for the nation’s development future, but the fact that regions with 
higher historic inequality (North and Northeast) were less successful in inequality reduction 
raises some concern. Income inequality is an impediment to sustained economic growth and it 
can engender negative attitudes within a community. If these issues continue to have a stronger 
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effect in the North and Northeast of the nation, the hope of a more egalitarian economy 
throughout Brazil as a whole may be elusive. 
 Despite the best efforts of any effective policy, it is impossible to create a program that is 
equally effective for all citizens of a country. A family with more than five children, a family 
without government issued ID cards, and families that live far away from their municipal seat of 
government are already at a disadvantage in terms of the value they can receive from 
participation in a program like Bolsa Família. Moreover, an individual is subject to the 
effectiveness of their municipal government, school, and health systems when they to participate 
in Bolsa Família conditionalities. Furthermore, if additional research supports the results of this 
regression analysis that variables associated with economic development, GDP per capita and 
service sector employment, correspond to increased income inequality, then the path of 
economic development in Brazil needs to be evaluated with a more critical lens.  
 This research can help pave the way and provide an empirical reference for future 
research on inequality reduction in Brazil. The relationship between formal sector employment 
and municipal level organization could be further assessed through descriptive data about the 
different characteristics of municipal level governments and data representing government 
benefit programs should be included as well. This deeper level of analysis could help explain 
how neighboring municipalities in the same state can witness such different results in their GINI 
score reduction. 
From 2000 to 2010, the pattern of inequality reduction in Brazil shows that municipalities 
that were able to operate within the boundaries of federal norms were most adept at reducing 
income inequality. Incentivizing formal employment so more workers will have formal 
protections and safe environments is a key step in this process; however, in Brazil these 
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incentives have occurred at the detriment of those employed in the informal sector. Ultimately, 
the federal government should pay particular attention to the limiting factors for income 
inequality reduction across municipalities. If historic, culturally specific factors contribute to 
inequality differently in different regions, a national plan to reduce inequality should allow the 
flexibility to tackle these issues head on. When Brazil is able to accomplish this and provide 
municipalities with the support they need to address their unique challenges, Brazil will achieve 
a development model in which all regions are afforded the opportunity to flourish.  
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APPENDIX 
Region 
 
State Largest 
Municipality 
Municipality 
Population 
(2010) 
2000 GINI 
Coefficient 
2010 GINI 
Coefficient 
Change in 
GINI 
Coefficient 
North Rondônia Porto Velho 428,527 .61 .56 -.05 
North Acre Rio Branco 336,038 .61 .59 -.02 
North Roraima Boa Vista 284,313 .57 .58 .01 
North Amazonas Manaus 2,375,151 
 
.62 .61 -.01 
North Pará Belém 1,393,399 .64 .6 -.04 
North Amapá Macapá 398,204 .60 .59 -.01 
North Tocantins Palmas 228,332 .63 .58 -.05 
Northeast Maranhão São Luis 1,014,837 .65 .61 -.04 
Northeast Piauí Teresina 814,230 .64 .61 -.03 
Northeast Ceará Fortaleza 2,452,185 
 
.64 .61 -.03 
Northeast Rio Grande 
do Norte 
Natal 803,739 .63 .61 -.02 
Northeast Paraíba João Pessoa 723,515 .62 .62 0 
Northeast Pernambuc
o 
Recife 1,537,704 .67 .68 .01 
   44 
Northeast Alagoas Maceió 932,748 .66 .63 -.03 
Northeast Sergipe Aracaju 571,149 .63 .62 -.01 
Northeast Bahia Salvador 2,675,656 
 
.64 .63 -.01 
Southeast Minas 
Gerais 
Belo 
Horizonte 
 
2,375,151 
 
.61 .60 -.01 
Southeast Espírito 
Santo 
Villa Velha 414,586 .57 .56 -.01 
Southeast Rio de 
Janeiro 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
6,320,446 
 
.61 .62 .01 
Southeast São Paulo São Paulo 11,253,503 
 
.61 .62 .01 
South Paraná Curitiba 1,751,907 
 
.59 .55 -.04 
South Santa 
Catarina 
Joinville 515,288 .54 .49 -.05 
South Rio Grande 
do Sul 
Porto Alegre 1,409,351 .60 .60 0 
Central-
West 
Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Campo 
Grande 
786,797 .60 .56 -.04 
Central-
West 
Mato 
Grosso 
Cuiabá 551,098 .63 .59 -.04 
Central-
West 
Goiás Goiâna 1,302,001 .61 .58 -.03 
Federal 
District 
Federal 
District 
Brasilia 
 
2,675,656 
 
.63 .63 0 
 
 
